In 2017 there has been a significant amount of news and dialogue on
the topic of information security. America is now waking up to the
reality that it's true vulnerability is critical infrastructure reliance
on strategic networks and is worth analyzing in depth.
Operational Risk Management (ORM) in critical infrastructure sectors such as Energy, Finance, Transportation, Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and a dozen more, is alive and well. Yet the long view, requires a pivot from the cyber analogies of immune systems and daily hygiene scenarios simply to address cyber theft, denial of service, viruses and ransomware.
The growing priority problem-set is "Cyber Deterrence" and the U.S. is still a long way off from having this strategy in place. The current abilities of several known nation state adversaries, to launch and maintain a persistent attack on our critical infrastructure, requires a new and robust set of initiatives to solve this new reality and immediate cyber problem for national security.
The fusion of Homeland Security with U.S. Department of Defense planning to address "Cyber Deterrence" is necessary and beyond what has been accomplished to date. The attributes focused on "Continuity of Government" (COG) and "Continuity of Operations" (COOP) are paramount with solving the hard problem-set of U.S. Cyber Deterrence. Why?
A wider range of military cyber options are needed beyond diplomatic expulsions and economic sanctions and a clear policy framework must be in place for these deterrence options to be utilized against nation states.
The growing use of cyber offensive weapons requires an increased level of preparedness, offensive war games and planning including substantial integration with the U.S. private sector critical infrastructure companies. The resilience factors associated with Fortune 500 private sector companies is vital.
First, a substantial portion of the new problem-set, involves the use of offensive cyber weapons and the declaratory engagement policy with adversaries such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. This must include the key dialogue on attribution capabilities. Have you ever had a conversation with your information security team on the topic of attribution? If you haven't then now is the time to better understand this set of issues.
Second, the degree to which a private sector company has been under attack by non-state actors will in many cases provide an indicator of their current cyber deterrence capabilities. The question is, how would they respond and how resilient would they be if any new attacks were exponential in proportion to previous adversarial campaigns?
Third, the coordination with not only DOD and private sector companies also requires significant integration with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), State Department and the Intelligence Community (IC).
Non-Kinetic cyber actions utilized by the military is not new. Strategic U.S. ICT (Information, Communications & Technology) capabilities working side-by-side and in concert with the military is now more necessary than ever. Private sector organizations interacting and engagement with USCYBERCOM to establish working relationships that include COG and COOP level planning also needs to accelerate.
So what?
Operational Risk Management (ORM) in critical infrastructure sectors such as Energy, Finance, Transportation, Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and a dozen more, is alive and well. Yet the long view, requires a pivot from the cyber analogies of immune systems and daily hygiene scenarios simply to address cyber theft, denial of service, viruses and ransomware.
The growing priority problem-set is "Cyber Deterrence" and the U.S. is still a long way off from having this strategy in place. The current abilities of several known nation state adversaries, to launch and maintain a persistent attack on our critical infrastructure, requires a new and robust set of initiatives to solve this new reality and immediate cyber problem for national security.
The fusion of Homeland Security with U.S. Department of Defense planning to address "Cyber Deterrence" is necessary and beyond what has been accomplished to date. The attributes focused on "Continuity of Government" (COG) and "Continuity of Operations" (COOP) are paramount with solving the hard problem-set of U.S. Cyber Deterrence. Why?
A wider range of military cyber options are needed beyond diplomatic expulsions and economic sanctions and a clear policy framework must be in place for these deterrence options to be utilized against nation states.
The growing use of cyber offensive weapons requires an increased level of preparedness, offensive war games and planning including substantial integration with the U.S. private sector critical infrastructure companies. The resilience factors associated with Fortune 500 private sector companies is vital.
First, a substantial portion of the new problem-set, involves the use of offensive cyber weapons and the declaratory engagement policy with adversaries such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. This must include the key dialogue on attribution capabilities. Have you ever had a conversation with your information security team on the topic of attribution? If you haven't then now is the time to better understand this set of issues.
Second, the degree to which a private sector company has been under attack by non-state actors will in many cases provide an indicator of their current cyber deterrence capabilities. The question is, how would they respond and how resilient would they be if any new attacks were exponential in proportion to previous adversarial campaigns?
Third, the coordination with not only DOD and private sector companies also requires significant integration with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), State Department and the Intelligence Community (IC).
Non-Kinetic cyber actions utilized by the military is not new. Strategic U.S. ICT (Information, Communications & Technology) capabilities working side-by-side and in concert with the military is now more necessary than ever. Private sector organizations interacting and engagement with USCYBERCOM to establish working relationships that include COG and COOP level planning also needs to accelerate.
So what?
The House has joined the Senate in calling for the Department of Defense to update its cyber strategy and to more clearly define the meaning of cyber deterrence.
The House on July 14 overwhelmingly passed the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, which included a number of cyber-related amendments, including a provision directing the secretary of defense to "develop a definition of the term 'deterrence' as such term is used in the context of the cyber operations of the Department of Defense; and assess how the definition...affects the overall cyber strategy of the Department."
The Senate's draft of the NDAA establishes a U.S. cyber deterrence and response policy and calls on the administration to develop a clear cyber deterrence strategy.The Chief Information Warfare Officer (CIWO) has been born...is it a myth?
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